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AbsTrACT
background Several performance- based financing (PBF) 
evaluations have been undertaken in low- income countries, 
yet few have examined community perspectives of care amid 
PBF programme implementation. We assessed community 
members’ perspectives of Support for Service Delivery 
Integration - Performance- Based Incentives (‘SSDI- PBI’), 
a PBF intervention in Malawi, and explored some of the 
unintended effects that emerged amid implementation.
Methods We conducted 30 focus group discussions: 17 with 
community leaders and 13 with mothers within catchment 
areas of SSDI- PBI implementing facilities. We analysed data 
using the framework approach.
results Community leaders and women had mixed 
impressions regarding the effect of SSDI- PBI on service 
delivery in facilities. They highlighted several improvements 
(including improved dialogue between staff and community, 
and cleaner, better- equipped facilities with enhanced privacy), 
but also persisting challenges (including inadequate and 
overworked staff, overcrowded facilities and long distances 
to facilities) related to services in SSDI- PBI- implementing 
facilities. Further, respondents described how four 
targeted service indicators related to maternal risk factor 
management, antenatal care (ANC) in the first trimester, 
skilled birth attendance and couple’s HIV testing sparked 
unintended negative effects as experienced by women 
and communities. The unintended effects included women 
returning home for delivery, women feeling uncertain about 
their pregnancy status, women feeling betrayed or frustrated 
by the quality of care provided and partnerless women being 
denied ANC.
Conclusion PBF programmes such as SSDI- PBI may 
improve some aspects of service delivery. However, to 
achieve system improvement, not only should necessary 
tools (such as medicines, equipment and human resources) 
be in place, but also programme priorities must be congruent 
with cultural expectations. Finally, facilities must be better 
supported to expect and then address increases in client load 
and heightened expectations in relation to services.
bACkground
Malawi has made considerable progress in 
improving health in recent decades, yet 
challenges particularly related to maternal 
health remain. The country is among the 
most dangerous places in the world to become 
a mother;1 one in 34 Malawian women will 
die due to maternal causes in her lifetime.2 3 
Several programmes and policies unveiled in 
recent years both within Malawi and globally 
have sought to address maternal health. An 
intervention that has garnered considerable 
attention is ‘performance- based financing’ 
(PBF).
PBF is a health system intervention that 
provides incentives (monetary or tangible) to 
key questions
What is already known?
 ► There is mixed evidence on the impact of 
performance- based financing (PBF) programmes on 
health service utilisation and quality of care.
 ► Little is known on how communities experience care 
under PBF.
 ► Limited literature available indicates the emergence 
of unintended consequences concerning healthcare 
delivery under PBF.
What are the new findings?
 ► Beyond positive impacts on service delivery, un-
intended negative effects may emerge due to im-
plementation realities and can affect community 
experiences of care.
 ► PBF ability to produce change is constrained by 
health system factors which affect the implemen-
tation reality.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Health system factors and the socio- cultural ele-
ments should be taken into consideration when im-
plementing PBF programmes.
 ► Facilities must receive additional structural and hu-
man resource support to address both increased 
service load and enhanced expectations on quality 
of care induced by PBF.
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health facilities ‘for delivering specific services, provided 
the services follow explicit protocols, with a system of 
inspection and auditing to assure compliance’.4 Under 
PBF, the health service purchaser (such as a Ministry of 
Health or implementing body) works with health admin-
istrators and providers to devise performance contracts, 
which define both the performance indicators to be 
achieved and the manner to reward their achievement.5 
Further key PBF elements aimed at supporting facilities 
in improving performance include increased manage-
ment autonomy at the level of the single facilities and 
intensified service delivery monitoring and supervision 
by both health system and community stakeholders.6 7
Evidence from PBF programmes across low- and 
middle- income countries is mixed in regard to its impact 
on service utilisation and quality.8 9 PBF has been observed 
to yield a positive effect on maternal care services in 
Rwanda,10 Burundi11 and Tanzania,12 but not in Afghan-
istan;13 a positive effect on childhood immunisations 
in Cameroon14 but not in Rwanda,10 Afghanistan13 or 
Burkina Faso;15 and mixed effects on various indicators 
of quality of care.9 Incentives have also been associated 
with drawbacks such as gaming by providers to maximise 
results16 and perceptions of unfairness among providers 
in rewarding performance that negatively affects delivery 
of quality of care to clients.17–21
Although an increasing number of studies have explored 
quality of care within PBF, most of these are quantitative 
studies.10–13 22 Qualitative studies have primarily explored 
insights from providers.23–25 Literature on PBF experi-
ences by community members and healthcare clients 
is rare.24 26–29 This is despite evidence of some unin-
tended outcomes regarding provider behaviour towards 
clients.20 24 For instance, in an evaluation of another PBF 
programme in Malawi, women reported improvements 
in certain aspects of quality of care, but also continued 
incidences of disrespectful care in spite of the fact that 
the PBF intervention was coupled with conditional 
cash transfers to support women delivering at selected 
health facility.27 An evaluation in Tanzania found that 
providers developed strategies to reach targets that could 
be harmful to clients.30 They threatened to fine women, 
and to deny their children immunisations and health 
records if women did not deliver in a health facility.23 
Studies in Rwanda and Malawi found that health workers 
documented the care provided retrospectively in order 
to fulfil a target of ‘completed forms’ which was required 
to receive incentives.16 21
The main objective of this study is to explore collective 
perceptions of care by community members—including 
both clients and community leaders—during the imple-
mentation of the Support for Service Delivery Integration 
- Performance- Based Incentives (SSDI- PBI) programme 
in Malawi, a particular PBF programme which did not 
tie performance incentives to individual health worker 
gains. Sub- objectives included exploring community and 
clients’ perspectives on the improvements produced by 
the programme and remaining challenges. While not 
initially an aim of the study, we also highlight some of 
the unintended programme effects revealed by clients. 
Not only is an exploration of service users’ experiences 
valuable in understanding how PBF affects maternal care 
provision and use, but capturing clients' perspectives is 
crucial to guide recommendations regarding whether 
and how to modify health programs in the event of 
scale- up.
MeTHods
study setting
Malawi is a low- income country with an economy largely 
dependent on agriculture, and a health system largely 
dependent on foreign aid.31 One quarter of the coun-
try’s estimated 17.5 million citizens live in extreme 
poverty.31 Health institutions are either government- 
owned or faith- based organisations, with only a minority 
being managed by for- profit private institutions.32 Across 
all districts, implementation of health interventions is 
guided by the health sector strategic plan, which empha-
sises improving service coverage via an essential health-
care package (EHP).32 The EHP states a stipulated set of 
health services covering the most common conditions be 
delivered free of charge at point- of- use in public facilities 
and in private facilities contracted via service- level agree-
ments.32 Utilisation of healthcare services is relatively 
high, but EHP services are often inadequately provided33 
due to a shortage of human resources, poor infrastruc-
ture, lack of medical equipment and supplies and inad-
equate financing.34 This situation has resulted in slow 
progress towards reduction of morbidity and mortality in 
the country.35
In trying to address these challenges, the government 
of Malawi explored PBF as a means to improve access 
to health services of high quality. The country recently 
concluded the implementation of two PBF- specific 
programs entitled ‘Results Based Financing for Maternal 
and Neonatal Health’ (RBF4MNH),36 and ‘Support for 
Service Delivery Integration - Performance- Based Incen-
tives’ (SSDI- PBI).37 The focus of this paper is the latter 
programme, SSDI- PBI, implemented in 17 facilities 
across three districts: Mangochi, Nkhotakota and Chitipa.
The intervention
The SSDI- PBI programme and its implementation 
processes have been described in detail elsewhere.37 
The programme, which lasted 2 years, was introduced in 
2014 into a context where: funding for health resources 
was largely input based; financial autonomy was held at 
district and higher organisational levels (with health facil-
ities holding limited control over their own resources); 
accountability of health facilities to the health system or 
communities was largely informal and inconsistent and 
severe general shortages in human and material resources 
persist.33 38 SSDI- PBI is similar to other PBF programs in 
that rewards were provided to health facilities on provi-
sion of a predefined set of health services stipulated in 
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a service contract. In SSDI- PBI, improved service provi-
sion aimed to increase utilisation rates (also called ‘quan-
tity indicators’ (online supplementary file appendix 2)) 
across the maternal health continuum (during antenatal, 
delivery and postpartum periods), newborn and child 
health and HIV and AIDS care and treatment. Quality 
indicators emphasised improvements in both the facility 
environment (eg, clean rooms that offered privacy) and 
how care was provided (eg, medical equipment was avail-
able and functioning), see online supplementary file 
appendix 2. In addition, the programme relied on an 
explicit community assessment of quality of service provi-
sion (via community meetings defined as ‘community 
scorecards’ and exit interviews). Payouts to facilities were 
made based on the joint assessment of quantity indica-
tors, quality indicators and the community scores.
The specific focus of this qualitative study on maternal 
care arises from the fact that while SSDI- PBI did not 
exclusively address maternal care services, the interven-
tion aimed to improve maternal health by increasing the 
quantity (service coverage rates) and quality of: antenatal 
care visits within the first trimester, births attended by a 
skilled birth attendant (a doctor, nurse or midwife), post-
natal care within 7 days of delivery and patients coun-
selled for family planning.
The SSDI- PBI programme was different from many 
other PBF programs in at least two respects: (1) the 
programme did not provide any monetary incentives (in 
the form of salary bonuses) to individual health workers; 
and (2) the programme's incentives were exclusively 
goods- based, with the implementing agency coordinating 
the procurement and distribution of supplies and equip-
ment to facilities in line with targets and incentives set in 
the facility business plan.39
study design
This qualitative study was embedded within a broader 
mixed- methods evaluation of SSDI- PBI.37 Since our study 
aimed to explore group perceptions and experiences of 
SSDI- PBI, we employed qualitative methods.40 41 Because 
the team was interested in social norms, conversational 
interactions and bringing to the surface perspectives of 
the community in relation to healthcare amid SSDI- PBI, 
focus group discussions (FGDs) were used.
data collection
Data collectors were trained for 5 days (including 
pilot testing). Data collectors had previous experience 
collecting data to inform health interventions, and they 
had academic training in nursing, journalism, midwifery, 
social work, education, administration or medicine. 
The qualitative training emphasised the SSDI- PBI inter-
vention, FGD techniques and ethics. In March 2016, 
we conducted 17 focus group discussions with 4 to 12 
community leaders per FGD across the 17 facility catch-
ment areas (one FGD per facility). We also conducted 
13 FGDs with 5 to 10 mothers in the catchment areas 
of 13 facilities (FGDs were concluded on saturation of 
themes). Community health workers (including health 
surveillance assistants and volunteers) assisted in identi-
fying participants. In addition, data collectors canvassed 
villages and invited those present (and eligible) to partic-
ipate. Sampling was purposively focussed on gathering 
perspectives from those living in the catchment areas 
of SSDI- PBI implementing facilities who were either 
mothers or community leaders (village health committee 
members, ward councillors, chiefs, village headmen, 
religious leaders and traditional healers). Topics across 
FGDs covered impressions of facilities, changes in facil-
ities over time and knowledge and perceptions of the 
SSDI- PBI programme.
Techniques undertaken to collect trustworthy, 
high quality data followed the approach of natural-
istic inquiry put forth by Lincoln and Guba (1985),42 
including prolonged engagement, triangulation and 
reflexive dialogue (see table 1). Following each FGD, a 
lead researcher debriefed data collectors for informa-
tion regarding emergent themes, reflexive insights and 
questions that could merit more deliberate follow- up in 
later FGDs.43 During these meetings, the research team 
spoke openly about their thoughts and perceptions of 
the programme (both positive and negative) in order to 
build reflexive memos that were used to further inform 
the conduct of later interviews and, ultimately, the coding 
process. Notes captured during these debriefings were 
also shared with the wider research team (including senior 
authors) and formed the basis for coding all FGDs. All 
FGDs were conducted in the local language (Chichewa), 
recorded, transcribed, translated into English and quality 
controlled by bilingual research assistants. FGD tools are 
included in online supplementary file appendix 1.
data analysis
The first and second author analysed the data with 
support from all co- authors, drawing on the framework 
approach outlined by Pope.44 An inductive approach 
was used,40 meaning that themes were mainly generated 
from the data that were collected. First, the lead author 
repeatedly read transcripts and reviewed notes in order 
to gain familiarity with the data and understand connec-
tions across concepts.45 Second, the first author noted 
emerging themes from the text and coded chunks of 
data representing themes.45 Third, the first and second 
authors explored thematic areas by displaying the rele-
vant coded text in each category to identify key themes 
and inter- relationships. Finally, all co- authors interpreted 
findings by discussing and agreeing on key themes 
that addressed the research question. The process was 
conducted using NVivo software.
ethical considerations
Respondents were informed in writing and orally about 
the nature and scope of the study. Participation in the 
study was entirely voluntary. Informed consent was sought 
from all study respondents. Respondents signed or finger 
printed the consent forms to show that they understood 
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Table 2 Characterists of participants in leaders' FGDs
n %
Total 123 100%
District
  Chitipa (3 FGDs) 24 20%
  Mangochi (7 FGDs)* 43 35%
  Nkhotakota (6 FGDs) 56 45%
Sex
  Female 26 21%
  Male 97 79%
Age
  <30 8 7%
  30–45 47 38%
  46–60 53 43%
  >60 14 11%
Don't Know 1 1%
Role
  Traditional authority 46 38%
  Health advisory committee 37 30%
  Religious leader 15 12%
  Other 25 20%
*Number and respondents’ characteristics not available for one 
FGD conducted in Mangochi, due to field failure in recording the 
relevant information. Therefore, the table shows information for 
seven instead of eight FGDs for Mangochi.
FGD, focus group discussion.
Table 1 Techniques to enhance the credibility and confirmability of this qualitative study as informed by Lincoln and Guba's 
criteria42
Principle Execution of the principle in this study
(1) Prolonged 
engagement (scope)
 ► The research team is either originally from or has lived and worked in this setting over several years. The research team 
was attuned to the priorities, social dynamics and contextual factors pertinent to this study setting.
(2) Persistent observation 
(depth)
 ► The research team has been involved in multiple data collection activities pertinent to this project for a period of several 
months, with data collection for this specific substudy stretching over 2 months. The research team was attuned to tools, 
behaviours and relationships related to this issue in the study setting.
(3) Peer debriefing  ► Debriefings43 were conducted each evening throughout data collection and involved all members of the data collection 
team, sharing, questioning and comparing one another’s findings.
(4) Source triangulation 
(multiple data sources)
 ► The team collected data from multiple types of stakeholders and using diverse data collection tools across multiple 
settings.
(5) Analytical 
triangulation (multiple 
data analysts)
 ► Memos drawn up during peer debriefings informed the development of a codebook.
 ► Members of the research team who undertook data collection also participated in data analysis.
 ► All final results were reviewed and discussed by the full research team.
(6) Audit trail  ► Memos drawn up during peer debriefings formed the basis for an audit trail of the study.
(7) Reflexivity  ► Within the research team, those with extensive experience (as scientists or practitioners who are from the study setting, 
or have worked for years in the study setting) provided contextual insight. The research team encouraged one another to 
explicitly consider the lens through which they viewed the data, and how this lens affected the focus group discussion 
encounter (in terms of questions, probes and perceptions). These conversations were typed up during debriefings.
the conditions of the study and had agreed to take part. 
Further, respondents were informed to be free to stop 
any time if they felt it was important for them to do so. 
It was also made explicit to them that doing so will not 
disadvantage them in any way.
Patient and public involvement
Neither patients nor the public were involved in the 
design, conduct, reporting or dissemination of our 
research.
resulTs
Tables 2 and 3 show key respondent characteristics. Leader 
focus groups consisted of between 4 to 12 predominantly 
male participants, with group composition ranging 
from all male to 60% female, most of whom took part 
in their role as traditional authority, health centre advi-
sory committee member or religious authority. Women’s 
focus groups ranged from 5 to 10 respondents and were 
well balanced in regards to age, parity and pregnancy at 
the time of the FGD.
We first present an overview of the experiences 
and perceptions of women and community leaders in 
accessing maternal services in the context of SSDI- PBI. We 
present results distinguishing between areas of services 
delivery where woman perceived notable improvements, 
areas where pre- existing challenges persisted and areas 
where new challenges (unintended consequences) of 
the SSDI- PBI intervention emerged. We then outline the 
processes by which well- intended service goals lead to 
unintended effects.
In terms of improvements and challenges, community 
leaders and women had mixed impressions regarding the 
SSDI- PBI programme’s effect on facilities (see table 4). 
They highlighted several improvements, but also noted 
persisting challenges related to services received from 
SSDI- PBI health facilities. Community leaders were 
generally more conversant on the programme, attrib-
uting changes explicitly to the SSDI- PBI programme. 
Women were less conversant on the programme, but 
could speak at length about changes observed within facil-
ities in the preceding year (which aligned with the onset 
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Table 3 Characterists of participants in women's’ FGDs
n %
Total 90 100%
District
  Chitipa (1 FGD) 8 9%
  Mangochi (6 FGDs)* 55 61%
  Nkhotakota (5 FGDs) 27 30%
Age
  <18 9 10%
  18–25 52 58%
  26–35 24 27%
  >35 4 4%
Don't Know 1 1%
Parity
  0 19 21%
  1 15 17%
  2 23 26%
  3 19 21%
  4+ 13 14%
Unknown 1 1%
Pregnant at the time of FGD*
  Yes 33 37%
  No 46 51%
Don't Know 11 12%
*Number and respondents’ characteristics not available for one 
FGD conducted in Mangochi, due to field failure in recording the 
relevant information. Therefore, the table shows information for six 
instead of seven FGDs for Mangochi.
FGD, focus group discussion.
of SSDI- PBI). Stark or notable differences in perspectives 
did not emerge when comparing across facilities.
notable improvements
The most fundamental improvement described by both 
respondent types involved the appearance of facilities. 
Both women and leaders described how facilities looked 
better; they were cleaner, more inviting, had more equip-
ment, better landscaping, better fencing, bright curtains 
and (importantly for women) facilities began providing 
forms of privacy (such as screens) during childbirth. 
Across respondent groups—though not uniformly in 
catchment areas across facilities—respondents described 
a sense that facilities had a more consistent supply 
of drugs (several women mentioned iron tablets and 
Panadol), that providers were ‘better dressed’ and ‘doing 
more’ to reach clients living both near and far from 
facilities (particularly via ‘outreach clinics’), and that 
providers began to more heavily emphasise that women’s 
partners should be engaged in the care seeking process. 
Finally, community leaders in particular described how 
community- facility dialogue meetings provided a forum 
for clients to openly air ‘grievances’ and express their 
concerns to facility- based providers on topics such as 
client- provider interactions and opening hours. This 
was described as an awkward, sometimes combative 
endeavour, but was viewed as ultimately beneficial among 
leaders as it compelled providers to feel more beholden 
to the communities they serve and, as one leader said, 
‘to view us as people’. Leaders also mentioned that via 
discussions with providers, they learnt that they had a 
responsibility, as leaders, to advocate for the intervention; 
leaders described taking providers' messages to heart and 
thus encouraging men to accompany women to facilities, 
and encouraging women to visit facilities earlier in preg-
nancy, and to give birth in facilities. FGDs with women 
triangulated these findings.
Persistent challenges
The most fundamental persisting challenge described 
by both respondent types involved a sense that providers 
were ‘overworked’, ‘unhappy’, ‘bitter’ or ‘under stress’. 
Respondents were careful to note that there was not a 
negative change per se, as providers were not previously 
happy or stress- free. But since the onset of SSDI- PBI, 
respondents felt that providers had more demands 
placed on them without necessarily receiving additional 
human resource support. SSDI- PBI exacerbated pre- 
existing shortfalls, particularly when the programme was 
in its earliest stages. Other persistent challenges related 
to factors that respondents had thought would change 
(or should change) in tandem with the aforementioned 
improvements. For instance, respondents noted that 
there was outreach to attract more women to attend 
facilities earlier in pregnancy (this was viewed as an 
improvement); however, this outreach—and the earlier 
care- seeking it compelled—were not accompanied 
with improvements in availability of pregnancy test kits 
which meant that women saw no purpose in seeking care 
earlier. Women and leaders also highlighted that facilities 
remained overcrowded (a situation viewed as heightened 
amid PBI), that recently- delivered mothers were forced 
to share beds (a situation described as preceding PBI, but 
also exacerbated by it) and that many challenges related 
to distance such as pregnant and labouring women 
travelling far to reach facilities were not overcome. In 
contrast to what clients perceived in some facilities where 
drug supplies appeared to have improved, other facilities 
appeared to have exacerbated drug shortages.
How unintended effects can exacerbate challenges
Across the SSDI- PBI facility catchment areas, respond-
ents described their experiences of maternal and child 
healthcare in a manner that underscored how complex-
ities are likely to arise when a programme is imple-
mented in a setting that lacks necessary resources (such 
as medicines, equipment or health personnel) or when 
the priorities of the programme do not dovetail with 
the values, norms or preferences of the community 
(such as setting targets that collided with local gender 
norms). Four targeted service indicators were described 
copyright.
 o
n
 April 20, 2020 at Universitatsbibliothek Heidelberg. Protected by
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001894 on 1 April 2020. Downloaded from 
6 Petross C, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e001894. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001894
BMJ Global Health
Table 4 Client and community leader perspectives on improvements and challenges amid SSDI- PBI
Perceptions of facilities Community leader and client quotes
Improvements
Facility looks nicer (curtains, 
cleanliness)
Women feel more comfortable and welcome in facility spaces.
"The place is just clean. Cleaner than before… Yes, we are very happy with the changes because we have 
now things happening which were not happening like our hospital is now well taken care of—for instance the 
painting it has been a long time since they had last painted the walls.” - FGD mothers, facility 17
Facility has improved 
infrastructure (clean toilets, in- 
house labs, dedicated maternity 
wings)
Women have greater confidence that the facility is prepared to provide care, and they enjoy privacy while 
giving birth.
“Just look at those new toilets. So clean!” - FGD mothers, facility 7
More community outreach/
engagement by providers with 
community directly and with 
health advisory committees, 
and via antenatal care outreach 
clinics
Community leaders appreciate having a better- defined role in promoting access to care in their communities;
Women welcome information that helps them seek care in a timely and effective fashion.
"In the past community would not have ownership and were thinking that the facility is for government and 
there were not caring for it. After civic education, community is now aware that the facility belongs to them. 
When the chiefs or politicians ask them (community members) to do something like moulding bricks they do 
because they own the facility” - FGD leaders, facility 2
"… many things have been implemented. In the communities, there are committees that are working with 
chiefs … indeed there are women who are working in communities to enhance women to start antenatal 
care when they are pregnant” - FGD leaders, facility 9
"… outreach clinicians came to me after my child was born and educated me on antenatal care and its 
advantages… They encouraged us to go for regular check- ups … so that we prevent complications … so 
that we save our lives and the lives of our children.” - FGD mothers, facility 10
PBI facilities seem to have more 
drugs (especially paracetamol)
"…The drug consignments are coming in good intervals, so it’s like here at facility 11 we are not running out 
of drug stocks for long.” – FGD leaders, facility 11
Impression of enhanced desire 
to seek services (ANC, HIV, 
maternal health programs 
generally)
"Through this PBI programme more children are being vaccinated to reach the target, and there is more 
outreach being done compared in the past, and women are encouraged to be delivering at the facility, so 
we also did something on this that when a pregnant woman visits ANC, she receives a basin and those 
who have delivered at the facility receive a piece of cloth (chitenje). So this is all done because of the PBI 
programme, which is making us work so hard in order to win more money at our facility! As the result 
the population of families coming to this facility has greatly increased most especially pregnant women 
compared with the past.” - FGD leaders, facility 12
"PBI has taught us a lot. Our families are now going to the health facility together as a family for HIV testing 
and also encouraged to avoid maternal death.” - FGD leaders, facility 13
More equipment and materials 
(blood pressure machines, 
motorcycles, uniforms, 
computers, bed nets, 
lawnmowers)
"Of course … we like these changes… Yes, when you deliver at the postnatal ward, now there are 
mattresses, so at least we are sleeping on mattresses.” - FGD mothers, facility 11
"This year has brought good things like water. We are happy about it because… we don’t have to go to the 
river to wash. We can wash here.” - FGD mothers, facility 17
Distribution of items (mosquito 
nets) to pregnant mothers
"In just this past year, they've really been telling us about mosquitoes, giving us nets after we deliver our 
babies (women nod heads in agreement, smiling)” - FGD mothers, facility 13
More reliable operating hours "In the past years, the health providers would only attend to those clients who would come in the morning 
hours only, all those who came after lunch would be sent back and told to come the following morning but 
now these years, even a client who comes after lunch, they are attended to.” - FGD leaders, facility 5
"…even the way the services are being provided at the facility, the services are now being provided in good 
time, even if there may be a huge number of clients, but they are being attended to in time.” - FGD leaders, 
facility 10
Providers ‘forced’ to be nicer 
to clients
"These days, it's like they want to help us very well unlike before where people used to complain a lot, and 
providers would take their time in attending to us…They are now listening to us and when they have the 
medicines they give them faithfully… This is very, very welcome for us.” - FGD mothers, facility 8
“We are very happy because the providers treat us well now.” - FGD mothers, facility 15
“It's since 2015… (the nurses) have been receiving us so nicely, explaining things so nicely, welcoming us 
with openness” - FGD mothers, facility 1
Challenges unchanged
Chronic drug and supply 
shortages—pregnancy test kits 
not available during early ANC, 
iron tablets often out of stock, 
essential items not available 
in- house during delivery
"So when we are going to deliver our babies, we still even now we need to carry our own razor blades, 
candle, plastic papers, threads. We are always told not to forget these things.” - FGD mothers, facility 8
"…there are no drugs – when you are sick and you go for treatment you are told that there are no drugs. 
When our children are sick of malaria and we go to seek for medical attention we are being told that they are 
no drugs for malaria and we are stranded when we are told like that and they give us a prescription so that 
we go and buy from a private hospital, and we are saying that if we came to this hospital it means that we 
cannot afford the private hospital!” - FGD mothers, facility 4
Challenges in geographical 
access not overcome
"…because the big hospital is the (District 3) district hospital, which is far from here … sometimes a 
pregnant woman may start bleeding and call the ambulance …(but) it’s not here, it’s … somewhere else.” - 
FGD community leaders, facility 13
Continued
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Perceptions of facilities Community leader and client quotes
Challenges created or exacerbated
Men being encouraged 
to accompany women for 
services; to be attentive 
to women's health issues/
messages
"The problem is… men are not interested. They are not interested in family planning they want women 
bearing children now and again… Men are not accepting to come with their wives… to have their wives on 
family planning.” - FGD mothers, facility 1
“Why can't the doctor talk to our men directly? Teach our men directly.” - FGD mothers, facility 8
Inadequate staffing, 
overworked/ tired/ stressed 
providers
Women sympathise with some staff who have problems delivering quality care under greater pressure, but 
are reticent to return to facilities/ providers who resort to disrespectful care when under such stress
"As you understand that each person has time to rest so this is also causing the health worker to be harsh 
when attending patients because of tiredness. For instance, being the only health worker at the facility is 
a problem … same person work the whole day without resting but during night is also called to attend to 
a patient. Sometimes the health worker tell us not to call him for assistance because he is tired wants to 
sleep” - FGD Leaders, facility 16
“Sometimes, they just have no more patience. And then they just, they shout at us.” - FGD mothers, facility 
13
"We deliver (in the facility) because if we deliver at home we are charged a fine. We are scared to pay the 
fine. But when we delivery here, we are ignored and we suffer.” - FGD mothers, facility 11
"Most of the times the nurses do not respond to our call immediately and we are not closely monitored and 
assisted but we know that during this time its when we need the nurse most because anything can happen 
even complications may arise. Most of the times we received insults for only asking for their help so we 
are very concerned because of the treatment we are receiving at District 2 District Hospital especially in 
maternity has resulted in some mothers and babies dying.” - FGD mothers, facility 4
"…this baby (points to 1- month- old), I delivered at the hospital but instead of them welcoming me they were 
busy with their phones and when I tried to call the nurses they were just shouting at me … we are begging 
then to have mercy on us. " - FGD mothers, facility 4
Overcrowding in facilities and 
inadequate facilities (especially 
labour wards)
Women shared beds with other maternity clients after delivery. Clients screened for HIV did not have a 
private space for consultations. Waiting times were longer.
"The biggest problem is the labour ward. It is still small, and we heard that the maternity section will be 
extended but up to now nothing has been done, and the problems of space are still there. There are some 
women are delivering on the floor.” - FGD mothers, facility 8
“Women are delivering their babies on the floor.” - FGD mothers, facility 11
"… health workers are not enough…we usually wait for long hours before receiving care. Normally we wait 
from morning up to afternoon hours without assisted. This is because there is only one person who attends 
out patients.” - FGD Leaders, facility 7
ANC, antenatal care; FGD, focus group discussion; PBI, performance based incentives; SSDI- PBI, Support for Service Delivery Integration - 
Performance- Based Incentives.
Table 4 Continued
as sparking unintended negative effects after they were 
introduced as part of SSDI- PBI. In figure 1, we highlight 
leaders’ descriptions of four targeted services (column 
A), leaders’ descriptions of how providers operational-
ised the services (column B), how the operationalisation 
of the target was received and/or perceived by commu-
nities (column C) and the unintended consequence that 
eventually unfurled (column D). While figure 1 and this 
text emphasise negative unintended consequences, we 
note that clients viewed many positive effects of PBI (see 
table 1) yet positive consequences were viewed as both 
expected of and intended by the programme.
Compelling home delivery
The SSDI- PBI programme sought to increase the propor-
tion of skilled attendance at birth and referral of high- 
risk pregnancies to higher- level facilities. Leaders and 
women reported that the importance of giving birth 
in facilities was reiterated to them in the course of the 
programme. Leaders described telling women that 
they must go to facilities; women confirmed that they 
had received such messages from leaders. Women and 
leaders described thinking that the care on offer would 
be notably improved because the SSDI- PBI programme 
placed such an emphasis on making sure care was sought 
in facilities. Leaders and women thus described disap-
pointment with the level of crowding in facilities, and 
felt frustrated that issues of disrespectful maternity care 
such as feeling disregarded and/or talked down to by 
overworked or absentee providers during delivery were 
unchanged or in some cases perceived to have worsened.
Women who were identified as at- risk said they were 
now being referred to higher- level care, but were not 
afforded the means (whether funds for public or private 
transport, or access to a free- of- charge option such as 
an ambulance) to make a referral logistically or finan-
cially feasible. Although women were encouraged to save 
funds during pregnancy, this guidance felt hollow or out 
of touch in the context of poor crop yields, fuel shortages 
and generalised poverty. Leaders confirmed that referral, 
which they described as a message underscored in the 
programme, can be futile and dangerous as it could lead 
to births en route if families lack financial or logistical 
means to reach a facility or to sustain oneself once at a 
facility.
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Figure 1 Unintended effects described by leaders amid SSDI- PBI. ANC,antenatal care; SSDI- PBI, Support for Service 
Delivery Integration- Performance- Based Incentives.
Several women and leaders expressed frustration; 
respondents felt that they were strongly encouraged to 
support delivery in facilities as a direct result of PBI but 
this encouragement was not accompanied with improve-
ments that would make women feel safer during child-
birth. Paradoxically, the insistence that women attend 
facilities for birth led to instances of reinforcing under-
lying aversions to facility delivery.
Confusion among women regarding pregnancy
The SSDI- PBI programme sought to increase the number 
of pregnant women starting antenatalcare (ANC) in the 
first trimester. Leaders and women described knowing that 
this was a priority of the programme due to key messaging 
during outreach clinics and other health communication 
campaigns, and a behaviour that needed to be modified 
in the context of the programme. Women then assumed 
that there was a purpose in attending facilities for earlier 
ANC; that more care would be provided and/or more 
tests would be done to determine the existence and 
health of a pregnancy. Women described attending facil-
ities earlier in their pregnancies, but being disappointed 
to discover that they would not be given a pregnancy test, 
nor would they receive any additional care. Women said 
providers merely palpated their abdomen but could not 
confirm a pregnancy status and thus could not provide 
pregnancy- related care. This left many women disap-
pointed, as they remained uncertain of whether they 
were pregnant and they felt the time and energy required 
to forgo other activities in favour of seeking ANC was in 
vain. As one woman, age 24, from Facility 5 said, “They 
couldn't tell me anything! They couldn't even tell me 
how many months my pregnancy was”. The experience 
led several families to feel less certain about whether they 
were pregnant (since providers could neither confirm 
nor refute a pregnancy status); women also felt unsure 
of how their pregnancy may be progressing since no 
additional tests were conducted until a woman's status 
could be definitively (visibly) confirmed. This study was 
not designed to evaluate whether there was a quantifi-
able decline in the proportion of women given adequate 
care when presenting to the health facility. Deficien-
cies in care provision are likely to have existed before 
and persisted through PBF implementation. Women’s 
reports suggest that SSDI- PBI sensitised communities to 
the issue, thereby sparking disappointment, irrespective 
of changes or lack thereof in actual quality of care.
Burdens, delays and familial discord
The SSDI- PBI programme sought to increase couples 
testing for HIV. Leaders and women did not describe 
being knowledgeable about this priority specifically, but 
they were aware of an increased insistence on having 
men accompany their partners to facilities during preg-
nancy (whereupon HIV tests were advised and routinely 
administered). Several leaders described being co- opted 
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by facility- based staff to enforce a community- wide 
mandate that all pregnant women must attend ANC 
with their partners. Women concurred with this; they 
described how care was delayed or denied (particularly 
during early ANC visits) if they did not have an accom-
panying partner. The situation of needing a partner at 
ANC visits placed several women in a dilemma. A man 
could refuse to accept or publicly recognise paternity, 
or he may be constantly travelling and thus unavailable 
for health- related appointments. As one woman, age 
30, from Facility 5 said, "I started going to antenatal at 
5 months …it would be possible to go at 3 months, but 
I failed because my husband was in South Africa. … I 
waited for my husband to be back from the trip, because 
if I went on my own I could have been sent back”.
Alternately, a woman may prefer not to disclose the 
identity of her unborn baby’s father. In more mundane 
scenarios, boyfriends, partners or husbands could simply 
refuse to attend ANC, arguing that they feel unwel-
come at health facilities or that their time is better spent 
earning money for their families. Women who struggled 
to get a partner to attend described delaying their first 
ANC visit and ultimately attending ANC alone (where-
upon they were afraid of being scolded for not bringing a 
partner). In instances when men did accompany women, 
men were described as complaining that they felt uncom-
fortable in what was perceived as a female- dominated 
sphere, that they viewed facilities as overcrowded and 
that they felt awkward discussing health matters—espe-
cially regarding HIV—within listening distance of others. 
In still other instances, women resented that those who 
had a husband or male partner with them received faster 
or preferential treatment, which seemed to suggest that a 
man’s presence lent more credence to a woman’s health 
needs.
disCussion
This study outlines community perspectives on improve-
ments, persisting challenges and unintended negative 
effects throughout implementation of the SSDI- PBI 
programme. The findings contribute to the PBF litera-
ture in at least two ways. First, this study draws in insights 
from community leaders and childbearing women, 
perspectives that are often overlooked in academic liter-
ature related to PBF. Second, by presenting unintended 
effects that unfurled in the SSDI- PBI programme, the 
study highlights an under- researched area in the broader 
PBF literature and draws implementers’ attention to crit-
ical issues that may constrain or undermine success in 
similar programs.24 46
In terms of improvements experienced during the 
SSDI- PBI programme, similar to other PBF studies, 
findings suggest that such interventions can strengthen 
availability of resources and the amount and depth of 
dialogue between health providers and their catchment 
communities.47 48 It should be noted, however, that our 
article reports on community perceptions and does not 
attempt to quantify changes in quality of care, measured 
in terms of either resources or patient- provider dialogue. 
Findings relating to medical supplies echo PBF studies in 
Rwanda and Burundi where women receiving prenatal 
care had increased chances of having their blood pres-
sure checked,49 being given anti- tetanus vaccination49 
and being treated according to the national and inter-
national guidelines.10 47 PBF studies in other settings 
have also described enhanced communication between 
providers and their catchment communities; in Rwanda 
and Burundi, providers worked with community health 
workers and community leaders to disseminate health 
education on the benefits of receiving maternal care in 
facilities,10 and in those settings utilisation rates increased 
which allowed facilities to attain their bonuses.10
However, success in terms of conveying the impor-
tance of care- seeking for maternal care and HIV care 
was accompanied by several negative, unintended effects 
in our study and others.50 51 While providers worked to 
address quantity and quality indicators in the SSDI- PBI 
programme, women and community leaders reported 
unpleasant scenarios in the context of the programme 
that—paradoxically—re- affirmed community- held reser-
vations and hesitations about accessing facility- based 
care. In the absence of a more rigorous prospective study 
focussed specifically on ANC content, it is not possible 
to determine if (a) the programme worsened the situa-
tion in facilities thereby sparking disappointment or (b) 
the programme maintained the status quo in facilities 
yet heightened community expectations thus inducing 
disappointment or (c) the programme improved the 
status quo in facilities yet heightened community expec-
tations thus inducing disappointment. For example, in 
this study, women reported disappointment because they 
attended facilities earlier during antenatal period, but 
only had their abdomen palpated. It is likely that this 
approach could have been routine prior to SSDI- PBI, 
but the intervention- raised women's expectations of what 
to expect during an early ANC visit, which then led to 
disappointment.
The negative side effects highlighted in this study 
largely reflect challenges that arise when a demand 
for services increases without concordant increases 
in facility- based infrastructure, human resources and 
medical supplies. Several studies have demonstrated that 
PBF programs place formidable strain on facility- based 
employees in terms of workload,16 24 50 52 which was highly 
salient in this study.
Beyond experiences amid overworked personnel, we 
also found that well- intended facets of the SSDI- PBI 
intervention appear to have generated unintended, 
negative effects even when providers were adequately 
responding to an incentive with the ‘right’ behaviour.53 
The manner in which a well- intentioned indicator 
(here, couples testing for HIV during ANC) can spark 
resentment among women and intra- household marital 
strife generally was illuminating and echoed in related 
maternal health literature in Malawi.54 Another study 
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related to a PBF intervention in Burkina Faso also 
highlighted unintended negative effects; that study 
found that the process of community verification (a 
vital component of PBF requiring investigators from 
the community to verify that provider- reported services 
had been performed) inadvertently led to marital 
strife because respondents found it inappropriate for 
male verifiers to engage in private conversations with 
women—including those who had attended PBF clinics 
for maternal care.24 Equally illuminating in our study 
is the finding that referrals to higher- level facilities for 
childbirth can ultimately—and paradoxically—lead to 
home delivery. In this study context, facility- provided 
referral transport was often lacking and women did not 
have the means to secure their own transport. This situ-
ation speaks to a broader body of recent PBF literature 
that question whether such a massive, health systems 
overhaul is appropriate and feasible in low- and middle- 
income contexts.29 55
The evidence on the emergence of unintended conse-
quences reported in this study and in other studies from 
sub- SaharanAfrica19 24 56 57 partially resonates what has 
been documented earlier in high- income settings, such 
as the UK, where pay- for- performance systems have at 
times been observed to yield a negative impact on non- 
incentivised indicators.58–60 In addition to the difference 
that exists between pay- for- performance in high- income 
versus low- income system, we ought to note that the 
existing literature from high- income settings defines 
unintended consequences very specifically in relation to 
effects on non- incentivised clinical indicators and relies 
exclusively on quantitative methods. Our work instead, 
purposely relies on qualitative methods of data collection 
and analysis to allow a more open exploration of the issue 
at stake, looking for unintended consequences beyond 
clinical practice alone. In doing so, our work, similarly 
to the work of Turcotte- Tremblay et al,20 24 situates itself 
somewhat apart from the currently available literature on 
high- income settings and becomes propositive of a new 
and more open way of approaching the study of unin-
tended consequences, which could find applications also 
in high- income settings.
As a limitation, we highlight that experiences or atti-
tudes presented by respondents cannot be exclusively and 
wholly attributed to SSDI- PBI. Issues such as disrespect 
and abuse have emerged forcefully in recent literature 
within the Malawi context,61 similar settings62 and the 
region more generally.63 This study was cross- sectional. 
A longer, prospective study would more strongly allow 
researchers to link effects of given programme to inter-
vention at hand. This study reports on perceptions and 
does not give quantifiable data in terms of changes, 
comparing case and control facilities. Finally, this study 
would have been strengthened by drawing in perspec-
tives of providers regarding how the programme was 
operationalised and to what effect.
ConClusion
As an alternative purchasing mechanism to input- based 
financing, PBF programs such as SSDI- PBI hold potential, 
but also represent a tremendous endeavour in oftentimes 
weak health systems. This is especially true when PBF is 
not introduced within the framework of clear ministe-
rial governance as only one out of a set of reforms and 
implemented in conjunction with other health financing 
measures targeting collection and pooling functions. 
This qualitative study examined the benefits, drawbacks 
and unintended effects of SSDI- PBI, a PBF intervention 
in Malawi. Our study found that community leaders and 
women themselves made efforts to facilitate success in 
reaching indicators related to skilled birth attendance 
and proper management of maternal risk factors across 
health facilities. However, these inputs were not enough 
to overcome formidable structural and social barriers.
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